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In a school choice problem each school has a priority ordering over the
set of students. These priority orderings depend on criteria such as whether
a student lives within walking distance or has a sibling already at the school.
I argue that by including just the priority orderings in the problem, and not
the criteria themselves, we lose important information. More particularly, the
priority orderings fail to capture important aspects of the information from
which they are derived when a student may satisfy a given criterion across
multiple schools. This loss of information results in mechanisms that discrim-
inate between students in ways that are not easy to justify. I propose an ex-
tended formulation of the school choice problem wherein a “priority matrix”,
indicating which criteria are satisfied by each student-school pair, replaces the
usual profile of priority orderings.
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1 Introduction
In many school districts in the United States students are assigned to public schools
via a matching mechanism. Districts vary in the particular mechanism that they
use. Each mechanism is a solution to a matching problem called the school choice
problem.
This problem was first formulated as a mechanism design problem by Ab-
dulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003). Their article and the literature that followed it
have led to many school districts adopting mechanisms based on the Deferred Ac-
ceptance algorithm and the Top Trading Cycles algorithm. Indeed, this literature is
notable for its direct connection to policy making (see Roth, 2008). Certainly, the
formulation of the school choice problem as a problem of mechanism design has
had a highly significant and very positive impact, greatly improving how student-
school matching is conducted in many districts.
That formulation, which is the subject of this paper, is based on the classic
college admissions problem of Gale and Shapley (1962). It consists of five items:
(i) a set of students, (ii) a set of schools, (iii) a list of school capacity numbers, (iv)
a profile of student preference orderings over the schools and (v) a profile of school
priority orderings over the students. A school’s priority ordering is a ranking of
students based on criteria such as having a sibling already at the school or living
within walking distance of the school.
In this paper I argue that item (v), the profile of school priority orderings, can
fail to capture important aspects of the information from which it is derived. In
particular, important information is lost when a student satisfies a priority criterion
across multiple schools. This loss of information means that matching mechanisms
must treat situations that are substantively different from one another as though they
were identical. I show how this can result in unfair matches and how it disqualifies
mechanisms that are reasonable.
I define the school choice problem more fully in the next section and I use
simple examples in section 3 to show that this formulation can suppress crucial
information. I elaborate on those examples in section 4. On the basis of that dis-
cussion I propose a new formulation of the problem in section 5. Then I show in
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sections 6 and 7 how the concept of justified envy and the Deferred Acceptance al-
gorithm can be adapted to this new version of the school choice problem. I discuss
in section 8 the difference between my contribution and some recent literature on
the school choice problem. Section 9 concludes the paper.
2 The school choice problem
The standard formulation of the school choice problem consists of five items:
1. a set I of students,
2. a set S of schools,
3. a list of natural numbers, each indicating the capacity of a school,
4. a list of strict preference orderings over S, one for each student, and
5. a list of weak priority orderings over I, one for each school.
The total number of available seats across all of the schools must be at least as
great as the number of students, with each school having at least one available seat.
This list of five items can be found in, for example, Ergin and Sönmez (2006) and
Abdulkadirog˘lu et al. (2017).
A matching assigns each student to a school. The number of students assigned
to a school must not exceed the capacity of that school, and each student must be
assigned to exactly one school. A method of assigning students to schools may in-
volve some randomization. A mechanism is a function that associates a probability
distribution over the set of possible matchings to each school choice problem. An
expected matching is a matrix that gives each student’s probability of being matched
to each school.
It is important to note here that the schools do not set their priority orderings
autonomously. This is a key point of difference between the school choice problem
and the older college admissions problem. Priority criteria are chosen by the district
school board and these criteria induce priority orderings for all of the schools in the
district. One consequence of this is that schools are not considered to be strategic
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agents in the school choice problem. By contrast, colleges are considered to be
strategic agents in the college admissions problem. Similarly, in the case of the
school choice problem the usual definition of Pareto efficiency is “one-sided” (only
the preferences of students matter) whereas for the college admissions problem it is
“two-sided”.
3 Motivating examples
To help motivate a change to the standard formulation of the school choice problem
let us consider two simple scenarios. In scenario A there are three students i, j and
k and three schools s1, s2 and s3. Student i and schools s1 and s2 are in the Oak Hill
neighbourhood. Students j and k and school s3 are in Elm Hill. There is just one
available place at each school.
All three students agree that school s1 is excellent and that s3 is a low-performing
school. The students share the same preference ordering over the schools; they all
rank s1 first, s2 second and s3 third. This means that the preferences of the stu-
dents, without any other information, do not provide us with any reason to prefer
any particular matching over any other one.
However, when we take priority criteria into account we may find cause to dis-
criminate between possible matchings. The district school board has determined
that two priority criteria are applicable. We denote them by p and q. Criterion p
can be read as “lives within walking distance” and q as “has a sibling already at
the school”. These criteria are satisfied by student-school pairs as indicated in the
following priority matrix.
s1 s2 s3
i p,q p −
j − − p
k − − p
(1)
We see that schools s1 and s2 are within walking distance of i while s3 is within
walking distance of j and k. We also see that student i has a sibling who already
attends s1.
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How should we match the three students to the three schools in this scenario?
It surely is sensible to match i to s1. After all, i has a sibling at that school and
lives within walking distance. We can then use a fair coin to decide how to match
j and k to s2 and s3. Under this approach, the students face the following expected
matching. The entries show each student’s probability of being assigned to each
school.
s1 s2 s3
i 1 0 0
j 0 1/2 1/2
k 0 1/2 1/2
(2)
This is in fact the solution that all three of the standard mechanisms generate
for this scenario. Under the Boston mechanism, we assign as many students as
possible to their first-choice schools. Where a school is over-subscribed we refer
to that school’s priority ordering to determine which students are accepted. So
the Boston mechanism would give the available place at s1 to i. The other two
standard mechanisms, the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism and the
top trading cycles mechanism, are slightly more complex. For now it suffices to
say that they satisfy a principle called “Mutual Best” (see Morrill, 2013), just as
the Boston mechanism does. This principle says that if school s is the top choice
of student i, and student i is at the top of the priority ordering for school s, then i
should be assigned to s (unless the school cannot accommodate all such “mutual
best” students). Thus those two mechanisms agree with the Boston mechanism in
this case; student i should be assigned to s1 while j and k should assigned s2 and s3
according to a lottery.
Students j and k, and their parents, may be unhappy that the place at the most
desirable school, s1, is given to i with a probability of one and not included in
the lottery. But this assignment is entirely defensible. It can be defended on the
grounds that i has a sibling at s1. So the standard mechanisms have delivered a
perfectly reasonable outcome here.
Now let us consider scenario B. This is the same as scenario A but with one
feature removed. We now suppose that i does not have a sibling at s1. That is, the
priority criteria are satisfied as follows.
5
s1 s2 s3
i p p −
j − − p
k − − p
(3)
This is a significant change. The s1 and s2 columns are now identical. This
means that schools s1 and s2 differ from each other only in their desirability. They
do not differ with regard to the criteria set out by the district school board; s1 is
within walking distance of i but so is s2, s1 is beyond walking distance for j and k
but so is s2 and no student has a sibling at either s1 or s2. How should we match
students and schools in this scenario?
3.1 Three proposals for scenario B
Consider the following proposal. First, select one of the students j and k by lottery
and assign that student to s3. It seems appropriate to assign either j or k to s3
rather than forcing i to travel beyond walking distance. This means that either j or
k will travel to Oak Hill for their schooling. The limited capacity of the sole Elm
Hill school makes this unavoidable. Thus one Elm Hill student together with i will
attend school in Oak Hill. Let us say that k is the student who is matched to s3.
We must now match i and j to s1 and s2. Regardless of how we match them, i
will be attending a school within walking distance and j will not. So in choosing
between the two possible ways to match i and j to s1 and s2 the issue of walking
distance is not a discriminant. And both students have the same preference over the
schools. I propose, then, that we use a fair coin to decide who will be assigned to
s1 and who to s2.
In summary, by using a coin to decide who of the Elm Hill students will attend
s3 and then using a coin again to decide who of the remaining students will attend
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s1, we have the following expected matching.
s1 s2 s3
i 1/2 1/2 0
j 1/4 1/4 1/2
k 1/4 1/4 1/2
(4)
This seems like a reasonable solution for scenario B. However, it is not the only
approach we could take. An alternative approach would be the following. We begin
by assigning the place at s1 by fair lottery over all three students. This means that
every student has a probability of one third of being matched to s1. If student i is
not given the place at s1 then i is matched to s2. This ensures that i is not forced to
travel to Elm Hill. If the place at s1 is given to i then the place at s2 is assigned to j
or k according to a fair coin.
It is easy to see that j and k each have a probability of one third of being matched
to s1 and a probability of one half of being matched to s3. It follows that they each
have a probability of one sixth of being matched to s2. Hence, under this second
proposal we have the following expected matching.
s1 s2 s3
i 1/3 2/3 0
j 1/3 1/6 1/2
k 1/3 1/6 1/2
(5)
A third proposal is the following. Let us assign a distinct number to each student
by lottery. The students queue up to choose a school in ascending order of their
lottery numbers. Under this simple approach there is a risk that i may be left with
the place at s3. To avoid this, we add a caveat as follows. We reserve a place at
either s1 or s2 for i, using a fair coin to choose which one. The other students may
not take this reserved place unless i has already been matched to another school.
For example, suppose that we reserve the seat at s2 for i and also that i receives the
lowest lottery number. Then i will choose to take the seat at s1 and the reserved seat
at s2 is released so that the next student in the queue may take it. To take another
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example, suppose again that the seat at s2 is reserved for i but this time student i
receives the highest lottery number and j receives the lowest number. Then, first
in the queue, j takes the place at s1. Though second in the queue, k must take the
place at s3 because s2 is reserved for i. Finally, i takes the reserved place at s2.
Under this approach student i has a probability of two thirds of being matched
to s1. This is because i is matched to s1 if i comes first in the lottery (a probability
of one third) or if the place at s1 is reserved for i (a probability of one half). When
we subtract the probability of both events occurring (one sixth) we arrive at a prob-
ability of two thirds. Thus, under this third proposal the students face the following
expected matching.
s1 s2 s3
i 2/3 1/3 0
j 1/6 1/3 1/2
k 1/6 1/3 1/2
(6)
I submit that these three proposals are among a number of reasonable solutions
that are worth considering in the case of scenario B.
3.2 An unexpected difficulty
Naturally, these proposals would entail treating scenario B differently from scenario
A. This seems sensible given that the scenarios are indeed quite different from one
another. Yet, when we represent scenarios A and B as school choice problems, that
is, using the five items listed in section 2, we find something surprising. We find
that the difference between the two scenarios is lost. Both scenarios correspond
to exactly the same school choice problem. This is because no school’s priority
ordering changed when we moved from scenario A to B.
The school priority orderings are given by the following three columns. Let us







Of course, in scenario B we removed i’s sibling from s1 but this does not change the
priority ordering for s1. Student i continues to have higher priority for that school.
Since all five of the items that define the school choice problem, as given in sec-
tion 2, are unchanged across these two scenarios, a matching mechanism receives
exactly the same input for both scenarios. An immediate consequence of this is that
all mechanisms must generate the same probability distribution for both scenarios.
Therefore, if we are to assign the place at s1 to i in scenario A, on the basis that i has
a sibling at that school, then we must assign the place at s1 to i in scenario B too.
Indeed, this is what all three of the standard mechanisms do. Similarly, in scenario
B whomever of the Elm Hill students travels to Oak Hill for their schooling is auto-
matically assigned to the inferior Oak Hill school, s2. This is in spite of the fact that
our reason for making s1 exclusive to i in scenario A is absent in scenario B.
The way in which the school choice problem is defined imposes this cross-
scenario restriction. It severely limits the set of mechanisms that we can consider
and makes it impossible to treat students fairly in both scenarios. Expected match-
ing (2) is fair in scenario A but quite unfair in scenario B. Expected matchings (4),
(5) and (6) are arguably fairer than (2) in scenario B but they would be inappropriate
in scenario A. Yet we must choose a single expected matching to fit both scenarios.
The standard mechanisms generate expected matching (2) for both scenarios. In
doing this they impose a degree of unequal access to better schools that appears to
be needlessly high in the case of scenario B.
Of course, part of the inequality of expected matching (2) in that scenario can
readily be justified. In particular, the fact that i will definitely not be assigned to
the least desirable school s3 can be justified on the grounds that there is sufficient
capacity in local Oak Hill schools for i. However, another part of the inequality, the
exclusion of j and k from s1, arises because crucial information is missing from the
school choice problem itself.
4 The structure of priority
The scenarios that we have considered motivate us to reconsider the definition of the
school choice problem. The first step in developing a new definition of the problem
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is to identify precisely the particular issue that is revealed by those examples and to
discuss that issue in more general terms. That is what I do in this section.
In the preceding section we encountered two kinds of priority structure: the
priority matrix, as in (1), and the profile of priority orderings, as in (7). A priority
matrix indicates which priority criteria are satisfied by each student-school pair.
A profile of priority orderings consists of a ranking of students for each school,
wherein students are ranked according to the strength of their respective claims to
priority for each school. The earlier scenarios A and B are essentially about the
relationship between these two structures.
These two kinds of priority structure are, of course, very closely related. If we
have a priority matrix and we know the relative importance of the priority criteria
then we can determine the relative strength of each student’s claim to a place at
each school. That is, we can derive a profile of priority orderings. To see why
the relative importance of criteria matters, consider the case that one student has a
sibling at a particular school but does not live within walking distance while another
student does live within walking distance but does not have a sibling at the school.
To construct a profile of priority orderings in this case we must know which of these
criteria is the more important (or that they are of equal importance). Indeed, since
each student-school pair may satisfy multiple criteria, we need a ranking not just of
individual criteria but of combinations of criteria.
To make this more formal, let P be a set of priority criteria and let 2P denote
the power set of P. Let f be a mapping from I× S to 2P. For each student i in I
and each school s in S, f (i,s) is the set of priority criteria that are satisfied by the
pair (i,s). Thus, the mapping f describes the priority matrix (since the ordering
of the columns and rows is not important). As we have noted, f by itself is not
sufficient to induce a profile of priority orderings. Let  be a weak ordering over
2P that ranks criteria, and combinations of criteria, by importance. Let us write iRs j
to mean that student i is ranked equal to or above student j in the priority ordering
for school s. Then iRs j if and only if f (i,s) f ( j,s). In this way, f and  together
induce a profile of priority orderings.
As we have noted, it is the profile of priority orderings, and not the pair ( f ,),
that is primitive in the formulation of the school choice problem. This formula-
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tion implies, then, that the profile of priority orderings captures all of the relevant
information contained in the pair ( f ,) from which it is derived. However, the
examples that we considered in section 3 show that this is not the case.
To help clarify this point it is useful to make the argument more specific. If
f (i,s) contains p then let us say that student i has a claim to a place at school s on
the basis of p. The strength of this claim depends on the importance of the criterion
that underpins it, p. A student who satisfies multiple priority criteria for a given
school has multiple claims to a place at that school. In the following subsection I
make a distinction between connected and unconnected claims. Then I further di-
vide connected claims into two kinds: conjunctive and disjunctive. I argue that the
profile of priority orderings can be taken as primitive only if the claims they rep-
resent are unconnected or conjunctive in nature. However, I argue that, for matters
of school choice, connected claims are disjunctive in nature and so this approach is
not appropriate.
4.1 The nature of claims
The distinction between these kinds of claims is central to my discussion of the
school choice problem. However, this distinction is not special to school choice.
Indeed, let us briefly step away from the school choice problem and consider the
following set of four very simple economic problems.
In each problem there are two individuals i and j. In two of the problems we
are tasked with allocating two items of food to these individuals, and we must give
one item to each person. In the other two problems we must allocate a place on a
program at a professional school to each of i and j, with just one place available at
each school. There are two priority criteria involved in the problems and they are
labelled p and q. Let criterion p be, “this person is a vegetarian and this food is
suitable for vegetarians”, and let q be, “this person has achieved excellent grades in
subjects relevant to this program”.
The following grid of four priority matrices describes the four problems.
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Apple pie Meatloaf Apple pie Turnip
i p − i p p
j − − j − −
Medical Law Medical Business
i q − i q q
j − − j − −
In the upper-left problem individual i satisfies a priority criterion for one item, the
apple pie, and thereby obtains a relatively strong claim to that item. This is an
example of an unconnected claim. This means that the criterion that i satisfies for
this item is not satisfied by i for any other item. Similarly, in the lower-left problem
individual i has an unconnected claim to a place at the medical school. By contrast,
in each of the two problems on the right, individual i satisfies a single priority
criterion over multiple items. In the case of the upper-right problem, individual i
has a connected claim that is based on p and that spans the apple pie and the turnip.
This is a connected claim because it is underpinned by the same criterion across
both items. In the lower-right problem we find again that i has a connected claim
spanning multiple items, this time on the basis of q.
We have made a distinction between unconnected and connected claims. To
make the next distinction, between connected claims that are conjunctive and those
that are disjunctive, let us carefully consider each of the four problems. Let us
suppose that in the two upper problems both individuals would most like to have
the apple pie, and that in the two lower problems both individuals would prefer to
attend the medical school. How then should we match the individuals to the items
in each case?
Let us first consider the two problems on the left-hand side of the grid, in which
i has an unconnected claim to an item. In the case of the upper-left problem it is
sensible to give the apple pie to i even though both individuals would like to have
that item. We can point to p as our reason for doing so: we should assign the apple
pie to i because i is a vegetarian. In the case of the lower-left problem it is sensible
to allocate the place at the medical school to i. This time we may point to q as the
reason: i is the more deserving of the place on that program. The two left-hand
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problems, then, seem to be just superficially different from one another.
The two right-hand problems, in which i has a connected claim spanning two
items, appear to differ just superficially too. But this appearance is deceptive. In the
case of the upper-right problem it would be nonsensical to point to p as a reason for
allocating the apple pie to i. We may well take the view that i is entitled to receive
a food item that is suitable for vegetarians but both items satisfy that entitlement.
Perhaps the best solution here would be to use a fair coin to decide who receives
the apple pie.
By contrast, in the case of the lower-right problem it is perfectly sensible to give
the place at the medical school to i on the basis of q. Indeed, the same reason applies
as in the lower-left problem: i is the more deserving of the place on that program.
Individual i’s meriting of a place on the medicine program is not diminished by the
fact that i is deemed to be more deserving of a place at the business school too.
When we compare the two problems on the right of the grid we find that they are
very different from one another even though they share the same formal structure.
This observation motivates a division of connected claims into the two aforemen-
tioned categories: conjunctive and disjunctive.
Priority criterion q, that refers to merit, is an example of one that grants a con-
junctive claim. In the case of the lower-right problem, criterion q grants i priority
for the medicine program and for the business program, with emphasis here on the
conjunction. If, say, we were to allocate the business program to individual i, she
could appeal to q, together with her preference ordering of the programs, to argue
that she should be given the place on the medicine program instead, even though q
applies to both programs for her.
Priority criterion p, that refers to a dietary requirement, is an example of one
that grants a disjunctive claim. In the case of the upper-right problem, criterion p
is satisfied by individual i in respective of both items. However, i cannot sensibly
invoke p to argue that she should be the one to receive the apple pie when the other
item is a turnip.
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4.2 Loss of information
Suppose again that we seek to match a set of individuals to a set of goods. Let i, j
and k be the individuals and a, b and c be the goods. Let us suppose that all three
individuals have the same preference ordering; they all prefer a to b and b to c.
There are two priority criteria r and t. To make the example more concrete let r be,
“this person adheres to religious laws and this good is compatible with those laws”,
while t is, “this good is fully wheelchair-friendly and this person uses a wheelchair”.
Now suppose that we have the following profile of priority orderings.
a b c
i i i, j,k
j,k j,k
(8)
Here we see that all three individuals i, j and k have equally strong claims to c, and
that i has highest priority for a and b.
In this situation we find that important information is suppressed by the profile
of priority orderings. For example, it could be the case that i adheres to religious
laws and that both a and b are compatible with those laws while c is not. In order
words, (8) is consistent with the following priority matrix.
a b c
i r r −
j − − −
k − − −
(9)
However, (8) is also consistent with a very different situation. Consider the
following priority matrix, for example, in which good a is the only one that is
compatible with i’s religious beliefs.
a b c
i r t −
j − − −
k − − −
(10)
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We cannot determine, then, whether i has a disjunctive claim spanning a and b,
as in (9), or unconnected claims to each of a and b, as in (10). Yet it is perfectly
reasonable to wish to distinguish between those two possibilities when assigning the
goods to the individuals. After all, in the case of (10) we may point to r, together
with the fact that i would prefer to have a rather than b, as a reason to assign a
to i with a probability of one whereas in the case of (9) we cannot. So we see
in this example how a profile of priority orderings can fail to convey important
information.
On the other hand, when connected claims are conjunctive in nature a profile
of priority orderings arguably does convey all of the important information. To ex-
plain this point, it may be helpful to draw an analogy to the rule of “conjunction
elimination” in propositional logic. According to this rule we may infer P and Q
from P∧Q. In a similar way, a conjunctive claim that spans, say, goods a and b, is
no different to having an unconnected claim to each of a and b. If we “eliminate”
conjunction in this way, then we can simply consider each column of a priority mat-
rix separately. In this case we may find that a profile of priority orderings captures
all of the important information about the claims of the individuals.
To clarify this point, let us consider again profile (8) but this time suppose that
r and t are criteria that, when satisfied by one person over multiple goods, grant a
conjunctive rather than a disjunctive claim to those goods. To make the example
more concrete, suppose that r means, “deserving in virtue of good behaviour”, and
t means, “deserving in virtue of hard work”. As before, we do not know the un-
derlying priority matrix. It could be (9) or (10), as they are both consistent with
(8), and there are other possibilities too. But, in this case does it matter which is
the underlying priority matrix? When we compare (9) and (10), for example, there
is no obvious reason to prefer one matching for (9) and then some other matching
for (10). Arguably, since we can eliminate conjunction and effectively apply the
criteria to each good separately, all that matters is the relative strength of the claims
within each column of the priority matrix. Indeed, it follows from this argument
that the profile of priority orderings is a suitable priority structure in this case since
that is exactly the information the profile conveys.
In summary then, a profile of priority orderings captures the important inform-
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ation from its underlying priority matrix when we may regard the claims of in-
dividuals as applying to each item separately. In the case of a conjunctive claim
that spans multiple items we may “eliminate” the conjunction, and consider each
column of a priority matrix separately. But we cannot eliminate disjunction in this
way. This is why a profile of priority orderings suppresses important information
when individuals have disjunctive claims spanning multiple items.
4.3 Relevance to school choice
Since the school choice problem includes just priority orderings, the standard school
choice mechanisms effectively treat all priority criteria as though they grant con-
junctive claims to priority. In the context of student-school matching, we can cer-
tainly conceive of criteria of this kind. Criteria that are based on deservingness and
merit typically belong in this category. A student may be deemed more deserving of
a place at a particular school on the basis of grades or good behaviour. And, though
it would be very controversial, one could also argue that deservingness derives from
financial contributions. In the United States public high schools are funded partly
by property taxes. Perhaps a student could be deemed especially deserving of a
place at a public school on the basis that his or her parents have paid a large amount
in property tax.
However, public school choice programs in the United States do not involve
criteria of this kind. Following its Roundtable on Public School Choice, the Of-
fice of Educational Research and Improvement (1992) noted that “on principle, all
members of the Roundtable do not favor student-based admissions criteria”. Ex-
amples of student-based criteria are those based on grades, behaviour and criminal
records. Consistent with the views of the Roundtable, the priority criteria that are
applied in public school choice programs are about practical issues, such as the cost
of transport, and not deservingness. Typical criteria refer to walking distance or the
availability of bilingual teaching programs. These are pragmatic criteria that would
seem to confer disjunctive claims to school places.
This also explains why my argument applies specifically to the school choice
problem and not to the college admissions problem. In the case of college admis-
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sions, each college ranks students according to some combination of test scores,
grades, interviews and so on. Thus, students do not have disjunctive claims span-
ning multiple colleges, and so it is sufficient to have a priority structure that consists
of a ranking of students for each college.
5 A new definition
In this section I propose a new definition of the school choice problem. We have
seen that a profile of priority orderings, item 5 in the original definition, can fail
to capture important information from the priority matrix when students have dis-
junctive claims spanning multiple schools. I propose that we include the priority
matrix and the ranking of priority criteria, themselves, in the definition of the prob-
lem, replacing the profile of priority orderings that is derivable from them. In other
words, I propose that we make f and primitive notions in the problem. Crucially,
this allows us to see where a school’s priority ordering comes from. We can see
where there is a connected claim and we can identify the criterion that underpins it.
Accordingly, the seven items that constitute an extended school choice problem
are:
1. a set I of students,
2. a set S of schools,
3. a list of natural numbers, each indicating the capacity of a school,
4. a list of strict preference orderings over S, one for each student,
5. a set P of priority criteria,
6. a mapping f from I×S to 2P, the power set of P, and
7. a weak ordering  over 2P such that A⊆ B→ A B.
Returning to the earlier examples, let us observe that scenarios A and B become dis-
tinct from one another when they are represented as extended school choice prob-
lems. Let p denote one priority criterion, “lives within walking distance”, and let q
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denote the other criterion, “has a sibling at this school”. Then in the case of scenario
A f (i,s1) is {p,q} whereas in scenario B f (i,s1) is {p}. So item 6 is the formal
tool that accounts for the difference in this case.
One consequence of this extension of the school choice problem is that it ex-
pands the set of mechanisms that we may consider. Of course, this expansion is
worthwhile only if it encompasses mechanisms that are reasonable. To demonstrate
that this is the case, I provide in section 7 an example of how a standard mech-
anism can be adapted to the extended school choice problem in such a way that it
becomes sensitive to information about priority factors. In this case the mechanism
that I adapt is the Gale-Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism, which may be
implemented by the celebrated Deferred Acceptance algorithm.
A second consequence is that we may consider normative principles that are
precluded by the standard definition of the problem. Indeed, I suspect that important
normative aspects of student-school matching have been overlooked because of the
way in which the problem has been defined. In the next section I discuss a normative
concept that arises naturally once we extend the school choice problem.
Note also that the extended definition opens up a rich set of possible mechan-
isms and normative principles without removing anything that was possible under
the standard definition. Since we can construct a priority ordering for each school
we can derive a standard school choice problem from an extended problem. This
means that any of the standard mechanisms of student-school matching can be ap-
plied to an extended problem.
6 Justified envy
Justified envy, also called “priority violation” by Kesten (2010), is a central concept
in much of the normative analysis in the literature on the school choice problem. It
is defined as follows.
Justified envy. There is a student i and a school s such that (i) student i prefers
school s to the one that i has been assigned to and (ii) a student has been
assigned to s despite having lower priority for s than i has.
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Take either of the earlier scenarios A or B, for example, and suppose that student j
or k is assigned to s1 while i is assigned to s2. This is an instance of justified envy
because i prefers s1 to s2 and has higher priority for s1 than the student who has
been assigned to that school. However, I argue that this envy is rightly justified in
the case of scenario A only.
In scenario A, if student i is turned away from s1 then she misses out on attend-
ing the same school as her sibling. She and her family can justifiably feel that they
have been hard done by, and their complaint is clearly relevant to public policy. In
the case of scenario B, on the other hand, i’s claim to priority for s1 is based solely
on priority criterion p, that she lives within walking distance of the school. But, I
argue, this priority criterion grants her a disjunctive claim that encompasses both
s1 and s2. Since she has been assigned to s2 she cannot sensibly appeal to p to
justify her envy. Indeed, if we swap the assignments of the two students we achieve
no goal of public policy; the number of students attending a school within walking
distance is unchanged.
I propose therefore an alternative concept that I call strongly justified envy. To
help define this concept I introduce some notation here. Given a student i and a set
of priority criteria C, let S(C, i) be the set of all schools s such that C is a subset of
f (i,s). In other words, S(C, i) is the set of all schools that meet all of the criteria in
C with respect to student i.
Strongly justified envy. There is a student i and a set of priority criteria C such that
(i) student i prefers every school in S(C, i) to the one that i has been assigned
to and (ii) a student has been assigned to a school in S(C, i) despite having
lower priority for that school than i has.
The intuition behind strongly justified envy is the following. A student i cannot
sensibly appeal to C to justify his or her envy if it is the case either that i has in fact
been assigned to a school in S(C, i) or if there is a school in S(C, i) to which i would
not like to be moved.
The concepts of justified envy and strongly justified envy coincide in scenario
A and diverge in scenario B. In scenario A, if i is assigned to either s2 or s3 then
i regards the student assigned to s1 with strongly justified envy. This is because
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S({p,q}, i) contains just s1 in that scenario. In scenario B, on the other hand, the
matching exhibits strongly justified envy only in the case that i is assigned to s3. In
that scenario, S({p,q}, i) is empty and S({p}, i) is {s1,s2} and so there is no case
of strongly justified envy if i is assigned to s2.
The concept of strongly justified envy is relevant to the argument I make in this
paper because it is an example of a normative concept that is surely relevant to
school choice but that is excluded by the standard definition of the school choice
problem. In the next section I provide an example of a mechanism that, like the
concept of strongly justified envy, is sensitive to the additional information con-
tained in an extended school choice problem.
7 Deferred Acceptance
The famous Deferred Acceptance algorithm originates in a seminal article by Gale
and Shapley (1962). The algorithm is first applied to the school choice problem by
Abdulkadirog˘lu and Sönmez (2003). The resulting mechanism is called the Gale-
Shapley student-optimal stable mechanism. A key property of the mechanism is
that it always generates a matching that is free from justified envy (and for this
reason is said to be stable).
The standard algorithm, applied to school choice, works as follows. First, we
assign a distinct number to each student in I by lottery. These numbers are used to
break ties in the school’s priority ordering so that the ordering becomes strict.1 In
each round of the procedure students “propose” to schools. In the first round each
student proposes to his or her top-choice school. Each school considers all of its
proposers and decides who to hold and who to reject. In subsequent rounds, each
rejected student proposes to his or her next most preferred school. If a student is
“held” by a school at the end of a round then he or she proposes again to the same
school in the following round. This is because the schools release all students at the
beginning of each round. The procedure continues until a round ends with every
student being held by a school.
1For analysis of the surprisingly complex issues around tie-breaking in school priority orderings
see Erdil and Ergin (2008), Abdulkadirog˘lu, Che and Yasuda (2015) and Özek (2016).
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In each round of the procedure each school has a set of proposers. This set
includes those students who were held by the school at the end of the previous
round, and new proposers who were rejected by other schools in the previous round.
Let q be the capacity of a particular school. If the number of proposers is less than
or equal to q then the school holds all of its proposers in that round. If the number
of proposers is greater than q then the school holds the top q proposers according
to its priority ordering.
In this description, a school considers its proposers one-by-one and in ascending
ordering of their lottery numbers. As a school receives each proposal in turn, it may
possibly decide initially to hold a student and then later in the same round decide to
reverse this decision in light of a better proposal and reject that student. The school
always tentatively holds the first q proposing students, where q is the capacity of
the school. Then, as it considers each subsequent proposer, it may choose to hold
that student and thereby displace a student whom it had been holding. Thus, after
the first q proposals in a round, every subsequent decision to hold a student means
rejecting a student whom the school had previously chosen to hold. Whenever a
student is to be displaced, it is always the lowest-priority student held by the school
who is rejected. Where multiple students are tied for lowest priority the one who
has the highest (unluckiest) lottery number is rejected.
To decide whether to hold or reject each student the school applies the decision
tree shown in figure 1. Recall that the school releases all students at the beginning
of each round, thereby making all seats available. Hence the answer to the first
question, “Do we have a free seat?”, will be “yes” for the first q students and “no”
for all subsequent students. However, these first q students may be displaced before
the end of the round as the school considers successive proposing students.
To motivate a change in the decision tree shown in figure 1 let us return to our
earlier scenario B and apply the Deferred Acceptance algorithm. All three students
i, j and k have the same preference ordering. They all rank s1 first, s2 second and
s3 third. Thus in the first round of the procedure all three students propose to s1.
Let us suppose that j has the lowest lottery number and i has the second-lowest
lottery number. Then s1 considers j’s proposal first and tentatively holds j, simply
because this is the first proposal. Next s1 considers i’s proposal and because i has
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have priority over a
student we are holding?
yes no
Hold Reject
Figure 1: Standard decision tree
higher priority than j has, s1 decides to hold i, which means that j is displaced. To
complete the round, s1 considers k’s proposal and rejects it. In the second round, j
and k move on to s2 while i proposes again to s1. In the end, i is matched to s1, j to
s2 and k to s3.
Note that during the first round i automatically displaced j on the basis that i
lives within walking distance of s1 and j does not. However, we know that s2 is also
within walking distance of i. Why then must j be immediately displaced from s1
once i proposes? I argue that in this situation there should be a non-zero probability
that s1 continues to hold j and rejects i on the basis that s2 can accommodate i just
as well as it can accommodate j.
The following definitions are helpful to me in describing a modification of this
mechanism.
High priority. A student has high priority for a school if he or she has a top-q
position in the school’s priority ordering after ties are broken according to the
student lottery numbers (favouring lower numbers), where q is the capacity
of the school.
Exchangeable. A school s′ is exchangeable for school s with respect to student i
if f (i,s) is a subset of f (i,s′). That is, (i,s′) satisfies every priority criterion
that (i,s) satisfies (and perhaps more besides).
Selection number. Separately from the lottery numbers assigned to students to de-
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Figure 2: Alternative decision tree
termine the order in which they propose to schools, we randomly assign selec-
tion numbers to student-school pairs. For each student i we assign a distinct
number in {1, . . . , |S|} to each school in S by lottery. So a given student has
a distinct selection number for each school, but two students may share the
same selection number for a given school.
I propose that we replace the decision tree shown in figure 1 with the one shown in
figure 2.
The new decision node, the difference between the two mechanisms, is relevant
when a school receives a proposal from a student who (i) is not one of the first q
to propose to the school in that round and (ii) has higher priority than a student
who is tentatively being held by the school. Suppose that a school s receives such a
proposal from a student i. Let E be the set of all schools that are exchangeable for
s with respect to i. And let H be the (possibly empty) set of all schools at which i
has high priority. It is the intersection of these two sets, E ∩H, that matters at this
new decision node. It contains those schools that meet all the same criteria with i
as s does and from which i can never be displaced by a higher priority student. If i
has high priority for s then s itself is in E ∩H.
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If E ∩H is empty or contains only s then s will hold i. Otherwise s decides
whether to hold i based on the selection numbers than have been issued to i for the
schools in E ∩H and for s. If i has a lower selection number for a school in E ∩H
than he or she has for s then s rejects i. If not then s holds i. This means that the
decision of a school in regard to a proposing student does not depend on the position
of that school in the student’s preference ordering, which is a key characteristic of
the original algorithm.
To help clarify this second decision tree, let us consider again the case of scen-
ario B in which student j has lottery number one and i has lottery number two. As
before, all three students propose to s1 in the first round. Then s1 tentatively holds j,
the first proposer. Next s1 considers i’s proposal. Here we must identify the schools
s such that (i) school s is exchangeable for s1 with respect to i and (ii) student i has
high priority for s1. Only s1 and s2 meets these conditions. Thus whether s1 holds i
(displacing j) depends on the selection numbers that i has for schools s1 and s2. If
i has a lower selection for s1 then s1 holds i, otherwise s1 rejects i.
This means that before the student lottery numbers and selection numbers are
drawn, student i has a probability of two thirds of being matched to s1. This is
because i is matched to s1 if i has the lowest lottery number (probability of one
third) or if i’s selection number for s1 is greater than i’s selection number for s2
(probability of one half) and those two events are independent. Indeed, the expected
matching that the students face in scenario B under this mechanism is (6).
Since the probability of i being assigned to s3 is zero we can be certain that
there will be no strongly justified envy in the outcome. In fact, this mechanism gen-
erates a matching free from strongly justified envy for all extended school choice
problems. To see that this is true, when a school rejects a student l it is implied that
either (i) the school has already reached capacity, holding students who are equal
to or higher than l in its priority ordering, or (ii) there is exchangeable school that
is certain to hold l should he or she propose to it. Thus, l can fail to displace a
lower-priority student at a school but this can happen only if l is guaranteed a place
at an exchangeable school. Hence, strongly justified envy cannot arise.
Let us briefly consider the case of scenario A in which, as before, students i, j
and k receive lottery numbers two, one and three respectively. All three students
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propose to s1 in the first round. Then s1 initially holds j only to reject j when
i proposes. Student j is immediately displaced here because school s2 is not ex-
changeable for s1 in scenario A. In the end, i is matched to s1, j is matched to s2
and k is matched to s3. We can see that, before the lottery number are drawn, the
students face expected matching (2).
This mechanism, then, yields a different expected matching over the two scen-
arios A and B. This is the crucial difference between this mechanism and the stand-
ard ones and it is the point of my presenting this mechanism here. I submit that this
is not an unreasonable mechanism. Yet it is excluded by the standard definition of
the school choice problem. This concludes my argument for an expansion of the set
of school choice mechanisms. In the next section I discuss the relationship of this
paper to some recent literature.
8 Literature on diversity and slot-specific priorities
Socio-economic and racial diversity in schools is an important matter of public
policy in the United States and many other countries. Much of the recent literature
on the school choice problem addresses this issue. In order to facilitate mechan-
isms that are sensitive to diversity-related concerns, a number of variations of the
standard school choice problem have been defined.
Upon a cursory inspection, this paper might seem to be about diversity in schools
too. A reader may wonder whether the issue that I have raised here has not already
been dealt with in some way in the extensive literature on that topic. However, this
paper is not about diversity in schools. The issue that I raise in this paper is fun-
damentally different from the issues analysed in the existing literature. In this final
section I seek to clarify this point.
An exercise that is helpful in separating this paper from the existing literature is
to focus on the case that each school can accommodate just one student. The school
choice problem is normally a many-to-one matching problem but in this special case
it becomes a one-to-one matching problem. Though not realistic, this exercise will
help us to understand the fundamental difference between the topic of this paper
and the issues that are addressed in the existing literature. I begin by establishing
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that, unsurprisingly, the various models of the school choice problem that address
the issue of diversity in schools all collapse into the standard model in this case,
because diversity is simply not an issue when each school has one student.
Let us turn first to an important variation of the school choice problem called
the controlled school choice problem. In the controlled problem, school enrolments
are subject to exogenously imposed constraints that maintain diversity in schools.
These constraints usually take the form of lower or upper limits for students in
particular ethnic, racial or socio-economic groups. For analysis of controlled school
choice problems see, for example, Kojima (2012), Hafalir, Yenmez and Yildirim
(2013) and Ehlers et al. (2014). When the number of students at each school is
exactly one then quotas and other limits intended to ensure diversity clearly do not
apply.
Echenique and Yenmez (2015) introduce a model in which schools regard some
student types as being complementary to others, reflecting a preference for diversity
in their classrooms. A model of this kind is also studied by Bó (2016). Each
school has a choice function that is defined over sets of students instead of just
having a ranking of individual students. Given a menu of possible sets of students,
the choice function identifies the student body that the school would most like to
have. This choice may reflect a preference for diversity across different types of
student. Of course, in the special (and unrealistic) case that we are considering in
this section, wherein the capacity of each school is just one, a ranking of possible
student populations is no different from a ranking of individual students.
In another departure from the standard school choice problem, Kominers and
Sönmez (2013) consider slot-specific school priorities. Boston is an example of a
city that implements slot-specific priorities. In Boston, a “walk zone” priority factor
is applicable to just half of the seats (or slots) at each school. Previously, economists
had modelled this case by splitting each school into two schools, one sensitive to
the walk zone and the other not. Kominers and Sönmez argue convincingly that this
approach is unsuitable and they consider a school choice problem with slot-specific
priorities. Their work builds on the contribution of Sönmez and Switzer (2013). In
the special case that each school has just one slot, however, the idea of slot-specific
priorities is not relevant.
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Yet, the extended school choice problem does not collapse into the standard
version of the problem when each school has one student. Indeed, whether schools
have one student or multiple students is not relevant to the topic of this paper. This
helps us to see that the contribution of this paper is independent of the existing
literature on diversity in schools. By discussing the special case in which there is
one student for each school I do not mean to imply that the difference exists only in
that case. Rather, focusing on the case of one-to-one matching brings the difference
into sharp relief. The two topics are quite distinct from one another irrespective of
the size of each school’s capacity. This explains why the existing literature, though
extremely rigorous on the topic of diversity, does not cover the same ground as this
paper.
This paper is about an alternative formulation of the school choice problem in
which normatively significant information is not lost. By retaining and using this
information we may find that we can construct mechanisms that are potentially
fairer than the existing mechanisms. Of course, it may be that a greater degree of
diversity emerges as a by-product of mechanisms that treat students more fairly.
Nevertheless, fairness is a different matter from diversity and it is fairness that we
are concerned with here.
9 Conclusion
I have argued that the canonical definition of the school choice problem excludes
some methods of student-school matching in a way that seems arbitrary. I proposed
an extended definition in section 5. Items 5–7 in that definition are new and they
replace the list of school priority orderings in the original definition.
Items 5–7 have heretofore been “behind the scenes” in this literature. They have
always implicitly been the items from which school priority orderings are derived.
But they do not feature in the standard definition of the problem because it is tacitly
accepted in the literature that school priority orderings capture all of the relevant
information contained in those items. If this view is correct then it is convenient to
simply treat school priority orderings as primitive objects in the matching problem
and to discard those antecedent items.
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I compared two simple scenarios to argue that, on the contrary, this approach
results in the loss of important information. We saw that this loss of information
limits the set of possible solutions to the extent that those two very different scen-
arios must be treated as though they were identical. It is for this reason that I
propose the extended school choice problem in which items 5–7 are restored.
This alternative definition of the problem expands the set of mechanisms that
we may consider. My view is that this produces the natural solution space for the
school choice problem. And let us note that one need not desire to design new
mechanisms in order to find this expansion to be worthwhile. For example, existing
impossibility/uniqueness theorems that are relevant to school choice may become
more conclusive or may be undermined in interesting ways when they are applied
to a larger set of mechanisms.
To provide an example of how a mechanism can be made sensitive to this addi-
tional information I proposed an adaptation of the Deferred Acceptance algorithm.
Crucially, it would be impossible to define this new mechanism under the standard
formulation of the school choice problem.
I have also sought to clarify the difference between the issue I address in this
paper and the issue of diversity in student-school matching that is the focus of much
of the recent literature. The special case in which each school can accommodate
just one student helps us to see that this paper is quite separate from that literature
both in its motivation and in its proposals.
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